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THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE:
WHEN ARE MANUFACTURERS OF MILITARY





THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR defense' pro-
tects government contractors from liability for deaths
or injuries resulting from design defects in products man-
ufactured in strict accordance with government specifica-
* Marshall S. Turner, B.A. Queens College, 1968, J.D. Fordham University,
1972, is a partner of the New York law firm of Condon and Forsyth.
** Alan N. Sutin, B.A. Emory University, 1979, J.D. University of Georgia,
1984, is an associate of the law firm of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson.
I Some courts and legal scholars draw a distinction between the "government
contractor defense" and the "contract specification defense." See, e.g., Littlehale
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 802-04 n.16-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Note, Liability of a Manufacturer for
Products Defectively Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1982).
The two defenses interrelate and differ primarily in scope. The contract specifica-
tion defense does not apply to a design so obviously defective and dangerous that
a competent contractor of ordinary prudence would decline to follow the design.
See, e.g., McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Ky. 1980). In
contrast, the government contractor defense may bar recovery even when the gov-
ernment specifications are obviously defective and dangerous. See, e.g.,
Barnthouse v. California Steel Bldgs. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 72, 76-78, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 835, 838 (1963).
Not all courts draw a distinction between the two defenses. Since most of the
recent cases involving defectively designed military products do not make a dis-
tinction, and since most of these cases treat all of the precedent pertaining to the
defense labelled "government contractor defense," this article will not include a
detailed analysis of a separate "contract specification defense."
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398 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
tions. Originally, courts applied the defense only in
cases involving government contractors performing pub-
lic works projects such as road and sewer construction or
the dredging of rivers. The defense traditionally did not
find application in products liability actions. Beginning in
the 1960's, courts began to apply the defense to products
liability actions grounded on a theory of negligence.4
Several recent cases involving military products establish
a clear trend toward allowing the government contractor
defense in design defect actions 5 brought under theories
of negligence, strict tort liability, and breach of warranty.6
Examination of recent case law concerning the govern-
ment contractor defense in the context of military prod-
ucts liability cases reveals that the policy considerations
behind the defense today are broader and more complex
than they were during the days of the early public works
cases. In the public works cases, the underlying rationale
for the defense was the inherent inequity of refusing to
permit the contractor to share in the government's immu-
nity from suit.7 As applied to military products liability
cases, the defense involves additional considerations of
separation of powers and national defense.8
This article uses a three-step approach to examine the
government contractor defense in military products liabil-
ity cases. The first section briefly traces the development
of the government contractor defense from its early use in
public works cases to the four-pronged analysis currently
2 McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1043 (1984).
See infra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
Attempts to invoke the government contractor defense in cases involving
manufacturing defects have failed. See, e.g., Challoner v. Day and Zimmermann,
Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 3, 5 (1975); Whitaker v. Harvell-
Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969); Montgomery v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afd sub nom., Mont-
gomery v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 841 (1968).
( See infra notes 33-153 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 51-152 and accompanying text.
1986] GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
employed in military cases.9 The second section discusses
the recent federal court cases and the standard of proof
which currently must be met to prove each element of the
defense.' 0 The final section analyzes the judicial reaction
to the various rationales articulated to justify the defense,
and attempts to provide insight regarding the future of
the defense in the federal courts."
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
A. Origin and Early Development of the Defense
The government contractor defense derives from prin-
ciples first articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Yearsly v. WA. Ross Construction Co. 12 In Yearsly the plain-
tiff sought recovery for erosion of his waterfront property
allegedly caused by the construction of a dike by the de-
fendant pursuant to a contract with the federal govern-
ment.'" The plaintiff argued that the erosion constituted
a taking of property for which he should receive just com-
pensation under the fifth amendment. 14 The Court found
the contractor not liable, likening the contractor's posi-
tion to that of an "agent or officer" of the government.' 5
Since the defendant possessed valid agency authority to
carry out the project and since the defendant acted within
the scope of that authority, the defendant escaped
liability. 16
The Court's use of the term "agent" implies that a gov-
ernment contractor enjoys a grant of immunity similar to
9 See infra notes 12-153 and accompanying text.
1o See infra notes 158-261 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 263-300 and accompanying text.
,2 309 U.S. 18 (1940). Although the Yearsly decision is the only case in which
the United States Supreme Court recognized a form of immunity for federal con-
tractors, a body of state case law concerning the tort immunity of public contrac-
tors began to develop in the early 1900's. See Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 382 (1966).
is 309 U.S. at 19.
14 Id. at 19-20.
15 Id. at 20-21.
16 Id. at 22.
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the grant of immunity for persons sued in their individual
capacity as agents or officers of the government.' 7
Although the Yearsly opinion never expressly mentions
immunity, the Supreme Court cited Yearsly in the later
case of Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co. 18 for the proposition
that "government contractors obtain certain immunity in
connection with work which they do pursuant to their
contractual undertaking with the United States."' 9
One problem with the Yearsly decision lies in its failure
to provide any guidelines for determining when a govern-
ment contractor becomes an "agent" entitled to share the
government's immunity.20 A decade after the Yearsly deci-
sion, the Court made it clear that agency status is not au-
tomatic for government contractors. The case of Powell v.
,7 See Note, supra note 1, at 1050.
18 317 U.S. 575 (1942).
19 Id. at 583.
20 One court has gone as far as to find that a government contractor can be
both an independent contractor and an agent. InJohnson v. Bechtel Assocs., P.C.,
545 F. Supp. 783 (D.D.C. 1982), the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority
(Metro) was created with the express approval of Congress to develop and oper-
ate a transportation system. Id. at 784. The District of Columbia and the states of
Virginia and Maryland signed an agreement for a limited waiver of Metro's sover-
eign immunity as the exclusive remedy for the torts of its agents. Id. The District
and states did not otherwise waive the immunity of the jurisdictions entering into
the agreement. Id. Metro then contracted with Bechtel to oversee the safety of
the subway project and administer various construction contracts. Id. Plaintiff
sued Bechtel for negligent performance of its duties as a safety overseer after
plaintiff allegedly contracted silicosis from exposure to high levels of silica dust.
Id. Bechtel defended on the ground that it acted as an agent of the government
and thus possessed immunity. Id.
The Bechtel court applied a two-pronged analysis. First, it noted that basic
agency law requires the elements of consent and control. Id. at 785. Second, the
court focused on the contract and the manner in which the parties performed the
contract. Id. at 786. The contract provided that Bechtel could conduct operations
in the name of Metro subject to the approval of Metro, that Bechtel had to keep
Metro fully informed of contractual operations, and that Metro possessed the
right of approval over the Bechtel operations manual. Id. Bechtel held the right
to order a shutdown for safety violations; however, the company rarely did this
without prior approval from Metro. Id. at 787.
Under the circumstances set forth above, the court concluded that Bechtel ac-
ted as Metro's agent on safety matters and therefore Bechtel enjoyed immunity
from suit. Id. The fact that Bechtel also might be classified as an independent
contractor for other matters did not alter this result. Id. at 785.
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United States Cartridge Co.21 involved contractors who ran
munitions plants on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis for the
government. 2 The government supplied the materials
and held title to the sites, plants, equipment, raw materi-
als, and finished products.2 3 The contractors were re-
sponsible for manufacturing munitions according to
government specifications, operating the plant, and su-
pervising employees.24 The contractors argued that this
arrangement amounted to an agency relationship, ex-
empting them from the Fair Labor Standards Act.25 The
Court rejected the argument, characterizing the defend-
ants as "independent" contractors. 26 The Court based
this characterization on the duties of the plant managers,
as well as on an explicit term of the contract which stated
that "the Contractor is an independent contractor and in
no wise an agent of the government. ' 27
Since Yearsly, the existence of the government contrac-
tor defense has been recognized in a long line of cases
arising from public works projects, the majority of which
involve claims for the taking of property. 28 Most courts in
these cases adopted the Yearsly characterization of the de-
fense as a sharing of the government's immunity, offering
various rationales to justify extension of such immunity to
contractors.2 9 One court reasoned that if the law did not
afford contractors this immunity, actions against contrac-
tors who perform strictly in accordance with government
directives would make it "impossible for the United States
2 , 339 U.S. 497 (1950).
Y2 Id. at 498.
23 Id. at 500.
24 Id. at 500-01.
2-5 Id. at 504-05.
26 Id. at 505-06.
27 Id. at 505.
28 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963); Merritt,
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961);
O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 474 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Vt. 1979); Green v. ICI
America, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc.
v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Conn. 1965); see also Annot., 9 A.L.R.
3D 382 (1966).
29! See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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to serve the public by the erection of great works of inter-
nal improvement for the benefit of all."3 0 Other courts
have suggested that refusal to allow contractors to share
in the government's immunity undermines the "discre-
tionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA).3 t
B. Early Applications of the Government Contractor Defense in
Products Liability and Negligence Actions
As discussed above, 2 virtually all of the early cases
dealing with the government contractor defense involved
property damage resulting from contracts for the con-
struction of public works projects. Beginning in the mid-
1960's, however, courts began to recognize the defense in
products liability actions grounded upon a theory of neg-
ligence and in actions for negligent failure to warn.
Two of the earliest products liability cases to address
the government contractor defense arose in New York
and involved military products. While not calling the de-
30 Green, 362 F. Supp. at 1266 (quoting Chattanooga & Tennessee River Power
Co. v. Lawson, 139 Tenn. 354, 373, 201 S.W. 165, 169 (1917)).
11 See, e.g., Dolphin Gardens, 243 F. Supp. at 827. The Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1982), allows suit for injury caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The FTCA provides a broad waiver of the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity; however, it is by no means a complete waiver. For
example, the United States Supreme Court has held that the FTCA does not per-
mit a suit based upon a theory of strict liability. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799
(1972). Moreover, the FTCA itself lists several exceptions to the government's
waiver of immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. One such exception, the "discretion-
ary function" exception, precludes suits arising out of acts or omissions by gov-
ernment officials at the "planning level" of government, although the
discretionary function exception does not bar suits arising out of activity at the
"operational level" of government. A government decision stands a better
chance for characterization as a planning level decision if the government con-
sciously balanced policy considerations in arriving at the decision. See generally
Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception Under the Federal Tort Claim Act,
67 GEO. L.J. 879 (1979).
12 See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
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fense by name, the court in Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. recognized the existence of the government
contractor defense. 4 The plaintiffs in Montgomery sought
recovery for the wrongful death of servicemen killed when
a Navy dirigible crashed off the coast of New Jersey.35
The crash occurred when defectively manufactured seams
on the dirigible split during the flight.36 In a motion for
summary judgment, Goodyear asserted that it should not
be exposed to liability because, inter alia, the government
exercised almost complete control over the manufacture
of the airship in question and Goodyear built the ship ac-
cording to government specifications and under govern-
ment inspection. 7 The court denied Goodyear's motion
for summary judgment, concluding that material ques-
tions of fact existed as to the extent of government con-
trol over the manufacturing process.3 8 The court implied
that a sufficient level of involvement by the government
would provide a valid defense to the claims against
Goodyear. 9
Two years after rendering the Montgomery decision, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York stated in Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co.40 that
where a party contracts with the Government and the Gov-
ernment specifies the means by which the product is to be
manufactured and other details incident to the produc-
tion, the manufacturer's acts in accordance with the plans
are at the very least not measurable by the same tests ap-
33 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), afd, 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 841 (1968).
34 231 F. Supp. at 451.
- Id. at 449.
s , ld.
37 Id. at 451.
38 Id. Goodyear also alleged that some safety factors had to be compromised
because of the "advanced design" of the airship and the time pressures of produc-
ing sophisticated weaponry for the military. Id. at 450. The court was "impressed
by the sensitive questions of national defense raised," id., but did not address
further the experimental nature of the project.
- Id. at 451.
40 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
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plicable to a manufacturer having sole discretion over the
method of manufacture, and at the most are insulated
from any liability. 4'
In Littlehale a Navy seaman and a civilian employee of the
Navy were injured when blasting caps manufactured by
the defendant exploded prematurely.42 Plaintiffs brought
an action for negligent failure by the defendant to provide
a warning of certain inherent dangers in the use of blast-
ing caps.43 The blasting caps had been manufactured by
du Pont thirteen years earlier pursuant to a contract with
the Ordnance Department of the War Department.4 4 Du
Pont brought a motion for summary judgment based in
part on the government contractor defense.45 The court
granted du Pont's motion, not because of the government
contractor defense, but because the court found that du
Pont had no duty to warn under generally applicable tort
law.46 Nevertheless, the court's statement quoted above
clearly indicates willingness to accept the basic concept of
the defense.47
C. Unequivocal Acceptance of the Government Contractor
Defense in Product Liability Cases Involving
Design Defects
Any ambiguities raised by the manufacturing defect and
duty-to-warn cases of the 1960's concerning the viability
of the government contractor defense in products liability
suits were extinguished by a series of design defect cases
I d. at 804 n.17.
4. Id. at 793.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 795.
4- Id. at 794. Du Pont pled alternatively that (a) they had no duty to warn, (b)
even if a duty existed it did not extend to the government employees injured, and
(c) the warnings provided were adequate. Id.
46 Id. at 801. The court found that the defendant produced the product for a
specific party who was well aware of the product's dangers; the defendant could
not be responsible for unforeseeable disposition of the product years later. Id. at
801-03.
47 The court stated that "the defense may have merit," but based its holding on
general tort theory. Id. at 803-04.
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in the late 1970's and early 1980's. These cases, all of
which involve government contracts to supply military
products, show a clear trend toward allowing the defense
in design defect suits grounded in negligence, 4 breach of
warranty,49 and strict tort liability. 0
In Sanner v. Ford Motor Co. 5t the court held that a pas-
senger injured when he was thrown from an Army jeep
could not recover from the vehicle manufacturer because
of the manufacturer's failure to equip the vehicle with seat
belts and a roll bar.52 The manufacturer built the vehicle
in strict compliance with United States Army plans and
specifications that did not require such safety devices.53
The court found it significant that Ford, at the Army's re-
quest, had designed seat belts to be installed in the jeep
but that the Army rejected installation of the seat belts
because they were incompatible with the intended use of
the vehicle. 4 Ford had no discretion to install seat belts,
roll bars, or other restraints without approval of the
Army.55 Granting Ford's motion for summary judgment,
the court stated,
To impose liability on a governmental contractor who
strictly complies with the plans and specifications provided
to it by the Army in a situation such as this would seriously
impair the Government's ability to formulate policy and
make judgments pursuant to its war powers. The Govern-
ment is the agency charged with the responsibility of de-
ciding the nature and type of military equipment that best
suits its needs, not a manufacturer such as Ford.
A manufacturer is bound to comply with plans and spec-
48 See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 51-61 and 70-74 and accompanying text.
5 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d
805 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
52 364 A.2d at 46-47.
- Id. at 47.
- Id. at 44. The Army believed seatbelts would interfere with immediate egress
from thejeep and also could expose passengers to greater injury in a rollover. See
id.
5'5 Id. at 46.
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ifications provided to it by the Government in the produc-
tion of military equipment. If it does it is insulated from
liability.56
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, af-
firmed the Sanner decision, placing special emphasis on
the fact that (1) Ford had no discretion with respect to the
installation of safety devices and (2) there was a "con-
scious, intentional determination by the United States
Government" not to include seat belts. Under Sanner,
then, the government contractor defense arguably applies
only in the narrow circumstances where a contract com-
pels a manufacturer to produce a product according to
specifications and the government makes an overt deci-
sion with regard to the design feature in question. In-
deed, at least one court in a pre-Sanner decision included
compulsion as an element of the defense.58 The distinct
trend, however, is to view the defense in much broader
terms, and none of the most recent cases require compul-
sion.5 9 Most recent opinions also suggest that the defense
does not depend upon an express decision by the govern-
ment against a design change,60 although the law on this
question remains less certain.
One other interesting point about the appellate deci-
sion in Sanner should be noted. The appellate court,
while acknowledging that the cases relied on by the trial
court involved negligence rather than strict liability,
stated that "the underlying policy reasons for shielding
56 Id. at 47.
57 381 A.2d at 806.
-8 Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th
Cir. 1961) ("It is elementary that compulsion must exist before the 'government
contractor defense' is available.") (emphasis in original).
10 Indeed, two recent cases expressly state that compulsion is not an element of
the defense. See Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1985); McKay
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984).
- A recent case from the Eleventh Circuit, Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
778 F.2d 736 (11 th Cir. 1985), suggests that an express decision by the govern-
ment is required. See id. at 744-45. Virtually every other court that has addressed
the question, however, has taken a contrary position. See, e.g., Tillett, 756 F.2d at
595-96; McKay, 704 F.2d at 448-51.
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the manufacturer from liability for acts done in manufac-
turing a product according to Government plans are
equally applicable in products cases to strict liability situa-
tions and negligence cases.''61
In 1980 the New York Supreme Court upheld the gov-
ernment contractor defense but limited its holding to con-
tracts for military purposes during times of war.62 In
Casabianca v. Casabianca63 defendant Teledyne Readco
manufactured a dough mixer during the early 1940's in
accordance with the Army's specifications for use in field
kitchens during World War 11.64 The mixer eventually
found its way into a New York pizza shop owned by the
plaintiff's father, where the plaintiff suffered injuries
when he caught his hand in the machine.6 5 The court
noted that the manufacturer built the mixer according to
Army specifications during time of war, and concluded
that a supplier to the military during wartime has a right
to rely on such specifications.6 6 To find otherwise might
prompt manufacturers to withhold needed equipment
from the armed forces because they consider the designs
to be imprudent or dangerous. 67 A manufacturer's con-
formance during wartime "to the specifications provided
to him should be, and is, a complete defense to any action
based upon design, whether faulty or not."68 The court
reserved judgment as to the availability of the government
contractor defense in actions involving products manufac-
tured at times other than in times of war.69
While the Sanner and Casabianca cases firmly established
that the government contractor defense may be raised
61 Sanner, 381 A.2d at 806.
62 Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348,428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
63 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
64 428 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 401-02.
67 Id. at 402.
68 Id.
6 Id. The court saw no need to examine immunities for products manufactured
during peacetime or for non-military purposes. See id.
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successfully in products liability cases involving design de-
fects, these cases left many questions concerning the de-
fense unresolved. Most notably, neither case definitively
set out the elements of the defense. Nor did either case
address the application of the defense in an action based
upon breach of warranty. The public works and early
products liability cases suggested as many restrictions and
caveats to the defense as there were decisions recognizing
the defense. Certainly, these early cases demonstrated a
lack of consensus among jurisdictions.
In 1982 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York answered many of these unresolved
questions in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litiga-
tion.70 In Agent Orange the court set forth three elements
that a defendant must prove in order to prevail on the
government contractor defense 71 : (1) The government
must have established the specifications for the product;
(2) the product manufactured by the defendant must meet
the government's specifications in all material respects;
and (3) the government must have known as much or
more than the defendant about the hazards associated
with the product.72 The court in Agent Orange expressly
held that the defense, if properly established, shields the
manufacturer against all claims, whether framed as negli-
gence, strict liability, or breach of warranty.73 The court
also concluded that the government contractor defense is
an affirmative defense and thus the defendant carries the
burden of proof as to each of its elements.7 4
The Agent Orange court applied the above elements in
70 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
71 See id. at 1055.
72 Id. at 1055. A subsequent opinion in the Agent Orange litigation modified the
third element of the defense so that if a contractor cannot prove sufficient govern-
ment knowledge the contractor still can avoid liability by demonstrating that
"even if the government had had as much knowledge as that defendant should
have had, it would have ordered production of [the product] in any event and
would not have taken steps to reduce or eliminate the hazard." In re "Agent Or-
ange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
71 534 F. Supp. at 1055-56.
74 Id. at 1055.
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the context of the production of a chemical herbicide 75;
however, the case appears to have set the standard for ap-
plication of the defense in all products liability design de-
fects cases involving military products. The three-
element approach 76 to the government contractor defense
formulated in Agent Orange has been adopted or cited with
approval in every federal court decision since 1982 involv-
ing design defects in military equipment built under gov-
ernment contract (although the defendant did not prevail
on the defense in every case).77
The first application of the Agent Orange three-element
approach to a military case occurred in Koutsoubos v. Boeing
Vertol, Division of Boeing Co. 78 In Koutsoubos plaintiff's dece-
75 See id. at 1056. "Agent Orange," as the court uses the term, denotes any
herbicide used in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam Conflict. See id.
76 The Agent Orange opinions do not list the government's immunity under the
Feres-Stencel doctrine, explained infra note 97, as a separate element of the defense.
The Agent Orange courts seemed to take such immunity for granted. Many of the
more recent government contractor defense cases do list Feres-Stencel immunity as
a separate, fourth element of the defense. See infra notes 158-180 and accompany-
ing text.
77 See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 744 (1 1th Cir. 1985)
(holding that government contractor could be liable for defective design of air-
plane stabilizer system), appealfiled; Schoenborn v. Boeing Co., 769 F.2d 115, 121
(3d Cir. 1985) (government contractor not liable for product defect since Army
knew about defect and approved design anyway), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 851
(1986); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 741 F.2d 656, 661-62 (3d Cir. 1984)
(defective design of Army bulldozer; remanded for trial in accordance with gov-
ernment contractor defense); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451-
52 (9th Cir. 1983) (suit based on alleged design defect of Navy aircraft and ejector
seat; government contractor defense does not apply when government establishes
only general specifications), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Bynum v. General
Motors Corp., 599 F. Supp. 155, 157-58 (N.D. Miss. 1984) (plaintiff injured in
Army cargo carrier accident could not recover from manufacturer since parties
stipulated to all three elements of government contractor defense); Hubbs v.
United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (applying government
contractor defense in action alleging defective design of Navy helicopter); Kout-
soubos v. Boeing Vertol, Division of Boeing Co., 553 F. Supp. 340, 342-43 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (government contractor defense barred recovery for defective design of
Navy helicopter).
The approach also has been adopted in at least one state court. See McLaughlin
v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 210-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding government contractor defense available t. defendant
who manufactured helicopter according to government specifications).
7, 553 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aft'd, 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 72 (1985).
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dent was killed when a Navy helicopter manufactured by
Boeing Vertol crashed while conducting a simulated res-
cue on a training flight.79 Plaintiff proceeded on a theory
of strict liability alleging that the helicopter possessed de-
fects making it "unsafe, unairworthy and dangerously un-
fit for its intended use."'80 Boeing moved for summary
judgment based upon the government contractor de-
fense. 8' The district court found the Agent Orange tri-fac-
tor analysis applicable, but denied summary judgment
because Boeing failed to meet its burden of proof as to
the third element of the defense.82 Trial on that issue re-
sulted in a finding that the "third element of the defense
had also been established. '83 The Navy exercised respon-
sibility for making final decisions on the helicopter's spec-
ifications and therefore the Navy knew as much as, and in
most instances considerably more than Boeing about the
hazards alleged by plaintiff.8 4 The district court finally
concluded that Boeing had established the government
contractor defense. 5 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed.8 6
The Third Circuit cited the Agent Orange approach with
approval in Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,8 7 when the
court held that a contractor who built a bulldozer for the
Army according to Army specifications could assert the
government contractor defense.8 In Brown an Army re-
servist bulldozer operator on weekend duty suffered inju-
ries when a tree fell over his bulldozer's blade and struck
him.8 9 Claiming that he would not have been injured had
the bulldozer been equipped with a protective structure
79 Id. at 341.
so Id.
8 Id.
82 Id. at 342-44.
11 Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 354.
94 See id.
85 See id.
86 Id. at 355.
87 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brown I].
88 Id. at 254.
89 Id. at 247.
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around the passenger seat, Brown sued Caterpillar on
theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach of war-
ranty.90 The district court granted Caterpillar's motion
for summary judgment based on the government contrac-
tor defense.9 1
On appeal the Third Circuit held that the government
contractor defense existed under Pennsylvania law, but
the court vacated the grant of summary judgment because
material questions of fact remained as to whether or not
the contract specifications were followed in all material re-
spects. 2 Although the appellate court in Brown did not
specifically adopt the three-element analysis from Agent
Orange, the court cited the elements in a footnote and
stated that the court found "attractive the novel approach
adopted by Judge Pratt."'9 3 The court in fact applied the
first two elements; i.e., the court required that the govern-
ment prepare the specifications and that the manufacturer
follow those specifications in all material respects.94 The
Brown court did not apply the third element, suggesting
without explanation that the relative knowledge of the
government and Caterpillar was not an issue.9 5




9s Id. at 254 n.17.
94 Id. at 254. The Third Circuit recently handed down a second opinion in
Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 741 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as Brown II]. In Brown I, discussed supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text, the
Third Circuit vacated summary judgment and remanded. Brown I, 696 F.2d at
257. On remand the district court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of
the manufacturer. Plaintiff appealed and, in Brown II, the Third Circuit once again
vacated and remanded. Brown H, 741 F.2d at 662.
Although the errors cited by the court in Brown II involved instructions by the
district court regarding failure to warn and defective design, the appellate court
found no error with the district court's instructions concerning the degree to
which a manufacturer must comply with the government's specifications. Specifi-
cally, the Third Circuit reiterated that the government contractor defense re-
quires neither compulsion to comply nor strict compliance. Id. at 662. Instead,
"the issue in a design defects case is whether the design of the product is or is not
that called for by the specifications." Id.
95 Brown I, 696 F.2d at 254 n.17.
704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
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States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Agent Orange three-part analysis and added a requirement
that the contractor enjoys immunity only if the govern-
ment also would be immune from liability under the Feres-
Stencel doctrine.9 7 In McKay the widows of two Navy pilots
killed in separate aircraft crashes brought an action
against Rockwell, the manufacturer of the aircraft and its
ejector seat system. 98 Both pilots died of injuries received
from the ejector system during ejection from their burn-
ing aircraft.99 Focusing on the immunity of the govern-
ment under the Feres-Stencel doctrine against indemnity
claims filed by government contractors for damages paid
to injured servicemen, the court found that "[iut is consis-
tent with this limitation to construe the government con-
tractor rule so as to avoid imposing on the contractor
liability properly attributable to acts of the
government." 0 0
In 1983 and 1984 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached opposite
conclusions in two government contractor defense cases,
both of which involved military helicopter crashes.' 0 '
Hubbs v. United Technologies10 2 adopted the Agent Orange ap-
proach and allowed the defense. 0 3 Schoenborn v. Boeing
07 In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Supreme Court held that
the United States remains immune from liability under the FTCA to a member of
the Armed Forces who sustains an injury while engaged in activities incident to
military service. Id. at 146. The Court broadened the scope of this immunity in
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977). In Stencel
the Court held that defense contractors may not seek indemnity from the federal
government for damages paid by the contractors to members of the armed forces
who sue for injuries incident to military service. See id. at 672-73. For a more
complete discussion of the Feres-Stencel doctrine, see generally Note, Johnson v.
United States, 51J. AIR L. & CoM. 1087 (1986). See infra notes 158-180 and accom-
panying text for further discussion of the Feres-Stencel doctrine as it relates to the
government contractor defense.
-0 McKay, 704 F.2d at 446.
00 Id.
too Id. at 450-51.
lot See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
102 574 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
los Id. at 100.
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Co. '0 4 also adopted the Agent Orange approach but held the
contractor liable. 0 5 The different outcomes apparently
resulted from inconsistent interpretations of the first ele-
ment of the defense. i0 6
The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida discussed the government contractor de-
fense in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.'0 7 In Shaw the
widow of a Navy pilot filed a products liability action
against the manufacturer of an aircraft that crashed into
the ocean after a catapult launch, killing her husband. 0 8
The design defect alleged in Shaw involved a disconnect
unit in the longitudinal flight control system of Grumman
KA-6D aircraft. 10 9 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that
the lack of redundancy in the flight control system made
the system's design defective." 0 In a memorandum opin-
ion the Shaw court held that Grumman had not met its
burden of proof with respect to all three elements of the
government contractor defense."' In particular the court
found that
there was an imbalance of knowledge about the defect be-
tween the supplier and the military at the time Grumman's
detail specifications were approved. Once aware of the
design defects, the Navy was lead by Grumman to believe
- 586 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 851 (1986).
o5 Id. at 718-21.
106 Compare Schoenborn, 586 F. Supp. at 717, with Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 99. In
both opinions the court acknowledges the Agent Orange proviso that the govern-
ment must have specified a particular product and design rather than a mere "per-
formance specification," before the first element of the defense can be satisfied.
See Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1056. The court in Hubbs suggested that the
government specifies a particular product and design when the government either
sets detailed specifications or approves the manufacturer's final design work. See
574 F. Supp. at 99 (citing McKay, 704 F.2d at 453). The Schoenborn court expressly
rejected the contention that mere government approval of final specifications
designed by the manufacturer will suffice. See 586 F. Supp. at 717.
107 593 F. Supp. 1066, 1073-75 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 778 F.2d 736 (1985),
appeal filed.
- Id. at 1067-68.
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that the installation of the self-retaining bolts would cor-
rect the problem. The Navy was justified in relying on
Grumman's design expertise and experience when it rep-
resented the new bolt would correct the problems caused
by the defect." l2
In addition, the Shaw court expressly adopted the position
of the Schoenborn court that "where a contractor estab-
lishes a product's detailed specifications and the govern-
ment merely approves them, the government contractor
defense is not available to the contractor."'"13
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Shaw on appeal."' In a
confusing and poorly structured analysis, the Eleventh
Circuit attempted to redefine the government contractor
defense. The court set forth a two-element defense which
the court termed "the military contractor defense."'"15
The court stated,
A contractor may escape liability only if it affirmatively
proves: (1) that it did not participate, or participated only
minimally, in the design of those products or parts of
products shown to be defective; or (2) that it timely warned
the military of the risks of the design and notified it of al-
ternative designs reasonably known by the contractor, and
that the military, although forewarned, clearly authorized
the contractor, to proceed with the dangerous design." 6
Taken out of context with the rest of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's opinion, this test appears on its face to be consider-
ably narrower and more restrictive than the test set forth
in McKay and its progeny. Read in its entirety, however,
the Shaw opinion sets forth a test substantially the same as
the test in McKay. Certainly, the two tests share the same
objective:
The over-riding objective of this test, again, is to deter-
mine whether or not a military judgment to go ahead with
112 Id.
,1, Id. (quoting Schoenborn, 586 F. Supp. at 718).
114 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985).
11. Id. at 739 n.3.
lus Id. at 746.
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a dangerous design was actually made. If so, the contrac-
tor that created or helped create the design is absolved
from judicially-imposed liability. If not, then the contrac-
tor is subject to the customary strictures of product liabil-
ity law.1 17
In the more recent government contractor defense case
of Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp.'1 8 the survivors of five
Navy divers who died from vacuum-induced bends in a
submarine hangar diving system brought suit against
General Dynamics, the system designer.119 Under the ex-
press terms of the Navy contract, General Dynamics as-
sumed full responsibility for all technical research, review
of all work produced, and all quality assurance actions
pertaining to the design of the product, including inspec-
tion of the final product.12 0
General Dynamics contended that the government con-
tractor defense shielded it from any liability to the plain-
tiffs.12' Adopting the Fifth Circuit's four-element
statement of the defense in Bynum v. FMC Corp., 122 which
the court noted "conforms to the trend in law on the gov-
ernment contractor's defense," 123 the Trevino court found
that General Dynamics failed to meet its burden of proof
on all elements of the defense. 124 In the court's opinion
General Dynamics successfully demonstrated governmen-
tal immunity under the Feres-Stencel doctrine, but failed to
meet each of the other three elements of the test. 1
25
As to the second element of the defense, the establish-
ment or approval by the government of reasonable speci-
117 Id.
118 626 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
1"1 Id. at 1331.
12. Id. at 1332.
121 Id. at 1334.
"2 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that trial court properly applied gov-
ernment contractor defense to deny recovery in action brought by injured na-
tional guardsman against manufacturer of defective cargo carrier).
123 626 F. Supp. at 1335.
124 Id.
5 Id. at 1334-38. The court stated, "General Dynamics has only established
the first prong of the four-part test. Thus, the government contractor's defense
does not apply." Id. at 1338.
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fications, the court found that the government provided
General Dynamics with mere skeletal guidelines, leaving
the design entirely to the discretion of General Dynam-
ics. 126 Moreover, the court found that although "the
trend in the law is to interpret the phrase 'established by
the government' as including the situation where the gov-
ernment, after having conducted a detailed review, ap-
proves drawings and specifications on which the
contractor assisted," the level of review in the Trevino case
fell short of "approval."' 127 The court concluded that
General Dynamics' level of participation made the com-
pany ultimately responsible for the "reasonably precise
specifications" involved in the case.' 28 The court relied,
inter alia, upon an internal General Dynamics memoran-
dum stating that contractor personnel accomplished most
of the design work unchecked by the Navy's experienced
technical experts. 29
The Trevino court observed that General Dynamics
clearly could not prove the third element of the defense,
compliance with government specifications, because Gen-
eral Dynamics established the specifications.13 0 The court
went on to note, however, that the system designed by
General Dynamics did not even conform to the general
requirement provided by the government.' 3 ' Similarly,
General Dynamics could not satisfy the final element of
the defense which concerns warnings, since General Dy-
namics assumed responsibility for advising and warning
the Navy about the safety aspects of the systems in ques-
tion. 3 2 The court found that not only did General Dy-
namics fail to warn the Navy about safety problems with
the system's design, but the company also failed to warn
the Navy about errors in the government's general re-
126 Id. at 1335.
127 Id. at 1336.
128 Id. at 1337.
12 See id.
1'so Id. at 1337-38.
-1' Id. at 1338.
I .2 Id.
1986] GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
quirements for their own working drawings.' 3 3
The Trevino decision continues the trend in the federal
courts toward construing the "reviewed and approved"
standard for the "establishment" element of the defense
to mean more than a superficial review of specifications
drafted by the contractor. 134 At the same time, the Trevino
decision makes the "warning" element requirements of
the defense more stringent. 13 5
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit addressed the government contractor
defense in two decisions13 6 handed down on the same day,
both of which overturned plaintiffs' verdicts in military
products liability cases. 37 The court expressly rejected
the more restricted view of the defense espoused by the
Eleventh Circuit in Shaw, and adopted the McKay state-
ment of the defense, including the "reviewed and ap-
proved" standard. In Tozer v. LTV Corp. l 3 plaintiffs
brought an action for the wrongful death of a Navy pilot
killed when the RF-8G reconnaissance plane he was pilot-
ing crashed into the ocean while performing a low-alti-
tude, high-speed fly-by of an aircraft carrier. 3 9 At trial,
plaintiffs argued that the plane crashed because a panel
known as the "Buick Hood" - a removable panel that
gives maintenance crews access to the equipment in the
nose of the aircraft - came off in mid-flight, resulting in a
153 Id.
'- See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text. See also Black v. Fairchild
Industries, Inc., 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,461 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (court applied govern-
ment contractor defense in routine fashion, granting Fairchild's summary judg-
ment motion on the issue of the contractor's liability for design of A-10 close
ground support aircraft).
"-' See infra notes 258-261 and accompanying text.
136 The Fourth Circuit actually handed down three decisions relating to the
government contractor defense on May 27, 1986. However, the court did not
reach the government contractor defense issues in one of the cases, Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986), because the plaintiff in
this case failed to meet his burden of proof under Virginia's products liability law.
See id. at 416.
1-7 See infra notes 138-150 and accompanying text.
-38 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986).
"1) Id. at 404.
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loss of control over the aircraft. 40 Specifically, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the designer of the Buick Hood' 4' com-
mitted negligence by failing to secure the panel with
redundant fasteners.142  The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiffs. On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed on
the ground that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct
the jury that the government contractor defense pre-
cludes recovery for negligence as well as strict liability. 143
In holding that the government contractor defense ap-
plies equally to negligence and strict liability claims in
military products liability cases, the Fourth Circuit fo-
cused on the separation of powers problems the defense
alleviates. 44 In addition, the court noted that ajury is ill-
equipped to decide issues involving national security
implications:
There is a danger in transporting the rubric of tort law
and products liability to a military setting and military
technology. While jurors may possess familiarity and ex-
perience with consumer products, it would be the rare ju-
ror - or judge - who has been in the cockpit of a Navy
RF-8G off the deck of a carrier on a low level, high speed
fly-by maneuver .... What would pose an unreasonable
risk to the safety of civilians might be acceptable - or in-
deed necessary - in light of the military mission of the
aircraft.... Difficult choices, trade-offs, and compromises
inhere in military planning that simply find no analogue in
civilian life. "This is not to say that [military] designers
are unconcerned with safety. Rather, they attempt to de-
sign as safe a plane as possible within the scope of its orig-
140 Id.
"4 The manufacturer of the RF-8G, Vought Corporation, originally designed
the airplane with a one-piece panel that wrapped around the top of the plane, all
of which had to be removed before maintenance could be performed on the air-
craft. Id. In order to provide for quicker access, the Navy asked Vought Corpora-
tion to modify the panel so that the system could be more easily and quickly
maintained. Id.
1,2 Id. at 405.
143 Id.
144 See infra notes 284-300 and accompanying text.
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inal mission." 145
Accordingly, the court found it essential that the military
refrain from intervention into military matters. "In hold-'
ing that the government contractor defense bars recovery
on a theory of negligence as well as strict liability," stated
the court, "we join the growing ranks of circuit courts that
recognize the utility of the defense and its inescapable
function in the deflection of unwarranted judicial over-
sight over matters of procurement and defense."1 46
The Fourth Circuit decided Tozer on the same day it de-
cided Dowd v. Textron, Inc. 147 Dowd involved a product lia-
bility action alleging negligence and strict liability for the
design of a rotor system installed on a military helicopter
that crashed during a flight instruction session, killing two
servicemen.' 48 As in the Tozer case, the court held that
"the elements of the defense do not vary with plaintiffs'
theory of recovery.' 1 49 Moreover, the court reiterated its
belief that military matters generally should not be sub-
jected to judicial review:
The required installation of the 540 rotor system in the
AH- IS helicopter may reflect the Army's judgment that,
despite the defects alleged in this tort suit, the equipment
had largely accomplished its mission and proved its mili-
tary worth. It may reflect the Army's view that safety
problems were remediable through pilot training, or that
any alteration of the rotor system entailed increased risks
or costs. It may simply reflect the Army's disinclination to
tinker with a system that had over time worked well
enough. Whatever the reasons, it is not up to the jury to
second-guess this military judgment. 50
145 Tozer, 792 F.2d at 406 (quoting Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp.
447, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)).
146 Id. at 409 (footnote and citations omitted).
147 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986).
148 Id. at 410.
149 Id. at 411.
-0 Id. at 412. For additional discussion of the Fourth Circuit's position on the
separation of powers rationale for the defense, see infra notes 297-299 and accom-
panying text.
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As a final note on recent acceptance of the government
contractor defense in a products liability context, it
should be pointed out that drafters wrote the government
contractor defense into the Uniform Product Liability
Law' 5 ' promulgated by the United States Department of
Commerce Task Force on Product Liability under the
chairmanship of Professor Victor E. Schwartz. 52 An ef-
fort currently is underway in the United States House of
Representatives to introduce a statutory limitation of lia-
bility for government contractors. The ranking minority
leader of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative
Fish, has introduced H.R. 4765, a proposed Government
Contractor Liability Reform Act of 1986.'1 3 The bill,
which has been introduced in the Senate as S. 2440,154 is a
component of President Reagan's response to the
problems of the insurance industry. The bill would apply
to all actions in federal or state courts filed against firms
that contract with the federal government, and the bill
would supercede all inconsistent state laws, but would not
create jurisdiction in the federal courts over cases which
otherwise would be matters of state jurisdiction.
Although the bill does not contain the elements of the de-
fense as set forth in the cases discussed above, it does il-
lustrate growing recognition of the need to provide some
form of protection to private contractors who do business
with the federal government. 5
5
,5, Uniform Product Liability Law, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
152 The Uniform Product Liability Law codifies the government contractor de-
fense at section 108:
Relevance of Legislative or Administrative Regulatory Standards and
Mandatoy Government Contract Specifications .... (C) When the injury-
causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in
compliance with a mandatory government contract specification re-
lating to design, this shall be an absolute defense and the product
shall be deemed not defective under Subsection 104(B), or, if the
specification related to warnings or instructions, under Subsection
104(C) or 105(A).
1- H.R. 4765, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
1 S. 2440, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
1- The following summary of the basic provisions of H.R. 4765 appears in
West Federal Case News, Congressional and Administrative Highlights, vol. 9, no. 24, at
51 (1986):
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III. STANDARD OF PROOF FOR EACH ELEMENT OF THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
The preceding section traces the development of the
government contractor defense and briefly reviews the re-
cent cases that firmly establish a trend toward allowing the
defense in cases that involve design defects in military
equipment supplied under government contract and built
to government specifications. Although not every ques-
tion regarding the defense has been resolved, Agent Orange
and its progeny provide substantial guidance as to what a
defendant must prove in order to prevail under the gov-
ernment contractor defense. 156 This section takes a closer
A contractor would be liable only for injury resulting from use
that was reasonable and foreseeable; he would not be liable for in-
jury resulting from an unreasonable or unforeseeable alteration of
the product or an alteration specifically prohibited or warned
against. The plaintiff would have to show that the contractor was
negligent in the design, production, distribution or sale of the prod-
uct, or that the product was defective. A contractor would not be
liable for failing to provide an adequate warning or instruction for a
danger that would be apparent to a reasonable person or otherwise a
matter of common knowledge.
Joint and several liability could not be applied to any action sub-
ject to this bill, unless the contractor acted in concert with another
person. The contractor could only be found liable for damages di-
rectly attributable to his pro rata share of fault or responsibility for
the injury except where the contractor acted in concert with another.
Noneconomic loss, including pain and suffering, emotional dis-
tress, and punitive damages, could not exceed $100,000 in all ac-
tions which arose out of or were caused by the same personal injury
or death. There would be no limit on economic loss.
A contractor could not be required to pay in excess of $100,000
for future economic loss in a single, lump-sum payment. He would
be permitted to make periodic payments based upon when the dam-
ages would likely occur. In that case, the court could require the
contractor to purchase an annuity. An award of damages would be
reduced by the following collateral sources: (1) any payment or ben-
efit paid for by any agency or instrumentality of the federal, state or
local government; or (2) any payment or benefit funded by a work-
ers' compensation or health insurance program funded by the em-
ployer.
The bill would limit attorney fees, paid on a contingency basis, to
25% of the first $100,000, 20% of the next $100,000, 15% of the
next $300,000, and 10% of any amount in excess of $300,000.
See supra notes 70-153 and accompanying text.
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look at the standard of proof for each element of the de-
fense as set forth in the cases already discussed.
A. The Government Must Be Immune From Liability Under
the Feres-Stencel Doctrine
Although early cases do not list the government's im-
munity under the Feres-Stencel doctrine as a prerequisite to
the government contractor defense, the immunity appears
to have been assumed. 157 Many of the later cases specifi-
cally list immunity under Feres-Stencel as a specific require-
ment of the defense. 58 It now seems clear that, at least in
military products liability cases, the government contrac-
tor defense is available only when the Feres-Stencel doctrine
bars a plaintiff from bringing an action directly against the
government. 59 Briefly stated, the Feres-Stencel doctrine
provides that an accident causing injury or death to mili-
tary personnel generally cannot provide the basis for
FTCA claims against the United States by either the vic-
tim or private defendants seeking indemnity. 60  The
scope of the Feres-Stencel doctrine has been the subject of
debate in several courts. This debate revolves principally
around the issue of whether the doctrine applies only to
injuries that arise from military service-related activities.
Specifically, courts disagree on whether the mere status of
the victim as a serviceman on duty bars his tort claim
against the government, or whether the claim falls prey to
Feres-Stencel only if issues concerning military discipline
'5 See supra notes 70-117 and accompanying text.
158 The requirement of immunity under the Feres-Stencel doctrine appeared as a
specific element of the government contractor defense for the first time in McKay
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983). After McKay other courts
began to list Feres-Stencel immunity as a separate element of the defense. See, e.g.,
Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 626 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (E.D. Tex. 1986);
Tillet v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1985). Whether or not
courts specifically list Feres-Stencel immunity as a separate and distinct element, it
seems clear that such immunity must exist before the defense will apply in a mili-
tary products liability case.
' ' See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
c0 See supra note 12-14.
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will arise. 161
The confusion arises from difficulty in determining the
precise rationale for the Feres-Stencel doctrine. 62 The Feres
opinion itself suggested several rationales which can be
divided loosely into two groups. The first group consists
of a legalistic interpretation of the FTCA. 63 The FTCA
provides that the government shall be liable for torts "in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private indi-
vidual under like circumstances."'", The Court reasoned
in Feres that Congress, by making the government liable
only to the same extent as a "private individual," in-
tended to limit the government's liability only to those
circumstances in which analogous tort liability would be
imposed on a private person.165 Since private individuals
do not conscript armies, engage in warfare, or exert life
and death discipline over other civilians, the government
should not be liable to servicemen in suits that involve
such activities. 166
The second group of rationales discussed in the Feres
decision might be referred to broadly as "public policy ra-
tionales." The Feres Court discussed two such rationales
in support of its decision. 67 First, the Court found that
,6, Compare, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.) (Feres doc-
trine does not bar recovery by military personnel injured while on active duty if
tortfeasor is a civilian employee of the government and suit will not adversely
affect military discipline), vacated, 760 F.2d 244 (11 th Cir. 1985), reinstated, 779
F.2d 1492 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (en banc); with Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d
1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (Feres doctrine bars recovery from the government by service
personnel injured incident to service, regardless of tortfeasor's military or non-
military status), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
162 See generally Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to
FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
,6 See supra note 31 for a discussion of the FTCA. The Feres-Stencel doctrine
rests on the Supreme Court's conclusion that while the text of the FTCA does not
contain a blanket prohibition on tort actions by servicemen, Congress surely did
not intend to waive the government's immunity for injuries to servicemen that
arise incident to military service. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146; see also infra notes 164-
170 and accompanying text.
- 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
6. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141.
1 Id.; see Salem, The Feres Doctrine And The Government Contractor Defense: Together
They Stand (Or Fall), Twentieth JALC Air Law Symposium G-5 (1986).
167 See infra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
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the "distinctly federal" relationship between the govern-
ment and military personnel should not be subject to dif-
fering state laws according to the place of the injury. 168
Second, the Court noted that veterans' benefits provide
an alternative compensation system.' 69 The Supreme
Court in subsequent cases added a third "public policy"
rationale, namely that suits by servicemen against the gov-
ernment would have a damaging impact on military
discipline. 170
Later cases have clarified and explained the Feres deci-
sion. In Chappell v. Wallace '71 the Supreme Court empha-
sized the military discipline rationale underlying the Feres-
Stencel doctrine.172 The Chappell Court denied recovery of
damages and injunctive relief to five Navy enlisted men
who sued their superiors alleging racial discrimination. 173
The Court opined that the same rationales that supported
the Feres doctrine also supported denial of relief in the
case at bar. 17 4 The Court cited the "special nature of mili-
tary life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action by
military officers and equally disciplined responses by en-
listed personnel" as the primary bases for the doctrine. 175
In the recent case of United States v. Shearer'71 the
Supreme Court suggested that the original rationales for
the Feres-Stencel doctrine, other than the preservation of
military discipline, are "no longer controlling."' 177 In
Shearer the mother of a serviceman murdered by a fellow
soldier sued the United States for negligently discharging
the military prisoner who murdered her son. 178 The
1- Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44.
1- Id. at 144-45.
170 See Salem, supra note 166, at G-5; see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S.
110, 112 (1954).
17, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
172 See id. at 298-305.
173 Id. at 297.
174 See id. at 297-305.
1 I7 d. at 304.
17 105 S. Ct. 3039 (1985).
177 Id. at 3043 n.4.
178 Id. at 3041. The mother alleged that the Army knew the murderer was dan-
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Court held that the Feres doctrine barred plaintiff's claim
because "[the claim went] directly to the 'management' of
the military [calling] into question basic choices about the
discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman."'' 79
The emphasis on military discipline in Shearer suggests
that the Feres doctrine does not bar all suits by servicemen
against the United States; the Feres doctrine shields the
government from liability only in cases which, if subjected
to judicial review, would adversely affect basic military
discipline. °8 0 The mere status of the victim as a service-
man on duty at the time of injury may not be sufficient,
standing alone, to invoke the Feres doctrine. 18  In a mili-
tary products liability context, therefore, the Feres-Stencel
immunity element of the government contractor defense
should make the defense available to a defendant only
under circumstances in which issues of military discipline
or control will arise.
B. Government Established Specifications for the Product
In Agent Orange the court stated that the government
contractor defense can apply only if the government "es-
tablished the design and specific characteristics" of the
product in issue.'8 2 The plaintiffs in Agent Orange argued
that "any role a defendant plays in preparation of the
specifications, whether it be advice to the government
about product design, or even touting of the product to
the government," should be sufficient to defeat this ele-
gerous, but failed to exercise reasonably sufficient control over him or warn
others of his release. Id.
179 Id. at 3043.
-o See id. at 3043-44. The Shearer Court quoted United States v. Muniz, 374
U.S. 150, 162 (1963):
In the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that
would obtain if suits under the [FTCA] were allowed for negligent
orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty.
- See Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1539-40.
182 534 F. Supp. at 1056.
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ment of the defense.'8 3 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument, stating that while the factors urged by plaintiff
may be relevant in establishing the relative degrees of
knowledge as between the government and the defendant,
all that is necessary on this element of the defense is for
defendant to prove that the product it supplied was a par-
ticular product specified by the government. If it should
appear that the contract set forth merely a "performance
specification", as opposed to a specified product, then the
government contractor defense would be far more re-
stricted than as described here.'84
Thus, the defense clearly may be applied in situations
where a defendant participated in the design of a product.
However, the degree of participation permissible under
Agent Orange remains unclear for two reasons. First, the
court offers no guidance for distinguishing a "perform-
ance specification" from a "specified product." Second,
the court provides no instruction for determining how
"restricted" the defense becomes if a specification is
found to be a mere performance specification.
The cases which followed Agent Orange provide some in-
sight into the distinction between a performance specifica-
tion and a specified product. In Koutsoubos the
defendant's senior contract administrator submitted an
affidavit declaring that the contract between the Navy and
the defendant, Boeing-Vertol, established a long list of
general and detailed specifications regarding safety fea-
tures, testing requirements, emergency exit marking re-
quirements, interior lighting requirements, and other
matters. 8 5 The affidavit further declared that "[e]very fea-
ture of the CH-46A, including its water landing and flota-
tion capability and emergency egress and lighting, was
tested and inspected to Navy requirements."' 8 6 The dis-
trict court held that this affidavit and its supporting exhib-
1.. Id.
184 Id.
18. 553 F. Supp. at 343.
186 Id.
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its provided sufficient proof of the government
specification element of the government contractor
defense. '8 17
On appeal the Third Circuit upheld the district court's
ruling, finding that although Boeing proposed some of
the specifications to the Navy, "these proposals simply ini-
tiated a 'back-and-forth' discussion between Boeing and
the Navy, with the Navy making all final decisions as to the
helicopter specifications."' '18
In McKay the Ninth Circuit evaluated the first element
by reference to dictum in the earlier public works case of
Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. 189 Mer-
ritt, Chapman held that a subcontractor who built a defec-
tive cofferdam in a dam project could be held liable for
damage caused by the collapse of the cofferdam.' 90 The
Merritt, Chapman court rejected the defendant's govern-
ment contractor defense because the contract left the de-
sign, materials, and method of construction entirely up to
the subcontractor. 9 ' The contract merely established the
height requirement for the cofferdam. 1'2 The court in Mc-
Kay concluded that the court in Merritt, Chapman correctly
applied the government contractor defense, but the Mc-
Kay court warned against construing the defense too nar-
rowly based upon the dictum in that case. 9 3 The McKay
court, referring to Merritt, Chapman, said,
When only minimal or very general requirements are set
for the contractor by the United States the [government
contractor] rule is inapplicable. The situation is different
where the United States reviewed and approved a detailed set
of specifications. This is precisely what may have hap-
187 Id.
88 Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 354.
18.. 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961).
-o Id. at 15-16.
Id.
Id.
is McKay, 704 F.2d at 451 ("The scope of the government contractor rule,
when applied in cases involving military personnel, should be drawn somewhat
more broadly than the dictum in Merritt, Chapman might suggest.").
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pened in the present cases.' 94
Thus, the McKay court gave the first element of the de-
fense a broad interpretation.
The McKay decision antedated two decisions in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania which reached diametrically opposite inter-
pretations of the government specification element based
upon similar sets of operative facts. In the Hubbs case dis-
cussed earlier, 9 5 the court adopted the McKay approach
to conclude that the defendant manufacturer of a military
helicopter would be shielded from liability by the govern-
ment contractor defense only upon a finding that the
United States either established specifications or ap-
proved a set of final, reasonably detailed specifications. 96
The court stated that "[d]efendants' burden of proof on
this particular element is not particularly heavy, however.
'[A]ll that is necessary on this element of the defense is for
defendant to prove that the product it supplied was a par-
ticular product specified by the government.' ,,t97
The district court opinion in the previously cited
Schoenborn case, 98 handed down just six months after
Hubbs, expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit rea-
soning in McKay. 199 Schoenborn involved the crash of an
Army CH-47C "Chinook" helicopter manufactured by
Boeing-Vertol.200 The crash killed all forty-six passengers
and crew members aboard. 20 The crash occurred when a
failure of the synchronization system caused blade-to-
.... Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
-.1 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
1w; Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 99.
10 Id. (quoting Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1056). It should be noted that in
spite of the above analysis, the court denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment because plaintiff introduced evidence that detailed specifications were
created by the defendants and defendants had not established final approval by
the government. Id.
M. See supra notes 104-74 and accompanying text.
11n: Schoenborn, 586 F. Supp. at 718.
2"' Id. at 714-15.
201 Id. at 715.
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blade contact of the helicopter's tandem rotor blades.2 °2
In a jury trial on the issue of liability only, the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.20 3 Boeing-
Vertol moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or, in the alternative, a new trial.20 4 Boeing-Vertol based
its motion in part on the government contractor de-
fense. 20 5 The court denied the motion, holding that Boe-
ing-Vertol could not satisfy the first element of the
government contractor defense because Boeing-Ve -tol,
and not the government, developed the detailed deiign
for the helicopter.20 6 The court concluded that the gov-
ernment did not "establish" the design specifications for
the helicopters, notwithstanding the fact that Boeing-Vertol
could not make any final design changes without the Army's
approval. 20
7
The district court in Schoenborn makes no reference to
the Hubbs opinion that mere government approval of de-
tailed specifications may satisfy the first element of the de-
fense. Although the court did not distinguish Hubbs, it
went to great lengths to distinguish McKay.2 ° a  The
Schoenborn court took the position that while the four pol-
icy reasons advanced in McKay for the defense 20 9 support
application of the defense when the government sets the
specifications, these policies do not support application of






200 Id. at 716-17.
207 Id.
208 See id. at 717-18; see infra note 210.
200 See McKay, 704 F.2d at 449-50; see infra note 210.
21o 586 F. Supp. at 717-18. First, the McKay court stated that holding a "sup-
plier liable in government contractor cases without regard to the extent of gov-
ernment involvement in fixing the product's design and specifications would
subvert the Feres-Stencel rule since military suppliers, despite the government's im-
munity, would pass the costs of accidents off to the United States .... 704 F.2d
at 449. In Schoenborn the district court found that "with respect to the civilian
plaintiffs in the case subjudice, this action would not be barred by the Feres-Stencel
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The Third Circuit reversed the district court decision in
Schoenborn and reaffirmed the earlier Third Circuit holding
in Koutsoubos.211 The Third Circuit in Schoenborn held that
the defense can be asserted successfully despite the con-
tractor's participation in the development of the design,
so long as the government approved the design after a
substantial review of the specifications.2 12 The circuit
court focused on two facts in finding that the district court
erred by submitting the question of liability to the jury.
First, the contract between the Army and Boeing-Vertol
contained a clause which stated that the prototype config-
uration of the CH-47C could not be revised until an Engi-
neering Change Proposal had been submitted by the
contractor and approved by the government.2 13 Second,
undisputed testimony showed that the Army performed
rigorous tests on the prototype and required certain de-
sign changes before the aircraft went into production. 4
doctrine because they are not members of the armed forces and because the heli-
copter crash did not occur during a military mission." 586 F. Supp. at 717-18.
Second, McKay asserts that when the United States approves design specifica-
tions, holding suppliers liable for design defects thrusts the judiciary into the mili-
tary decision-making process. 704 F.2d at 449. This raises concern about
separation of powers. See id. The district court in Schoenborn found that this policy
reason applies only when the defective element of the design relates to a military
matter. 586 F. Supp. at 718. The court stated, "There is no imposition of the
judiciary upon military decision making by requiring the helicopter to have a syn-
chronization system free from defects so as to enable it to fly safely." Id.
The third rationale for the defense offered in McKay is that in setting specifica-
tions for military equipment, "the United States is required by the exigencies of
our defense effort to push technology towards its limits and thereby to incur risks
beyond those that would be acceptable for ordinary consumer goods." 704 F.2d
at 449-50. The Schoenborn court noted that the tandem rotor design in question
had been used by Boeing for more than twenty years; thus, this was "not a case of
the Army pushing technology to its limits." 586 F. Supp. at 718.
Finally, McKay found that the government contractor defense provides an in-
centive for a supplier of military equipment to work closely with and to consult
military authorities in the development and testing of equipment. 704 F.2d at
450. In Schoenborn the court stated that a contractor has no incentive to consult
with the military if the contractor can insulate itself from liability simply by ob-
taining final approval of the specifications from the government. 586 F. Supp. at
718.
211 Schoenborn, 769 F.2d at 121-25.
212 Id. at 122-23.
213 Id. at 123.
214 Id. at 123-24.
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Taking these two factors into consideration, the circuit
court stated, "[I]t is evident that the Army retained final
authority over the design of the helicopter and that there-
fore the government 'approval' prong of the Koutsoubos
test has been met. 21 5
Another 1985 case dealing with the government con-
tractor defense in a military products case, Tillett v. JI.
Case Co.,216 adopts the McKay "reviewed and approved"
standard. 17 In Tillett the widow of a serviceman crushed
and killed in Germany when the front end loader he oper-
ated overturned, brought a wrongful death action in Wis-
consin against the manufacturer. 218 The plaintiff alleged a
design defect in the front end loader because the loader
did not have rollover protection.2 19 The district court de-
termined that Wisconsin law applied and that the Wiscon-
sin wrongful death statute would allow recovery only if
the act or omission causing the death occurred in Wiscon-
sin.2 2 0 The district court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the ground "that all design, manu-
facture and shipment of the loader occurred in Indiana,"
not in Wisconsin.221 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agree-
ing that plaintiff did not have a cause of action and adding
that even if plaintiff did have a cause of action, her claim
would be barred by the government contractor
defense.22
The Seventh Circuit in Tillett adopted the McKay rule
215 Id. at 124.
216 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1985).
217 See id. at 600.
218 Id. at 591.
219 Id. at 595.
220 See id. at 593-95.
221 Id. at 595 (citing the district court decision in Tillett, 580 F. Supp. at 1279).
222 Id. at 600. The circuit court stated,
[Tihis court alternatively holds that the district court should have
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the government contractor defense insulated defendant from li-
ability. We affirm the final judgment of the district court, however,
because we agree . . . that decedent's death was not caused in
Wisconsin.
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that establishment or approval by the United States Gov-
ernment of reasonably precise specifications for an alleg-
edly defective product satisfies the first element of the
government contractor defense.223 In Tillett the evidence
demonstrated that the government provided the defend-
ant with specifications for various component parts of the
front end loader. 4 These specifications did not include
rollover protection. 2 5 The defendant agreed to produce
the loader in conformance with the defendant's own com-
mercial specifications when the government specifications
were silent. 22 6 The government further required the de-
fendant to produce a prototype and to submit the proto-
type to the government for inspection and approval
before manufacturing the final product.22 7 The defendant
submitted a prototype of the front end loader that did not
include rollover protection, and the government ap-
proved the defendant's prototype. 2 8 The circuit court
stated, "Under these circumstances, this court finds that
the Government established reasonably precise specifica-
tions for the front end loader and approved any supple-
mentary specifications tendered by defendant in the form
of a prototype loader. ' 229 The Tillett court adopted the
McKay "reviewed and approved" approach because "the
Ninth Circuit's formulation best reflects the substantial
policies underlying the defense. ' 23 0 The court further
found that conformity to the government's specifications
was not an issue 23' and that the defendant had met its bur-
den of proof with regard to the fourth element concern-
ing the government's relative knowledge of dangers
223 See id. at 598-600.






230 Id. at 600.
231 See id. at 599. The plaintiff did not dispute that the manufacturer complied
with the government's specifications. Id.
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associated with lack of rollover protection. 2
The circuit court discussions of the government con-
tractor defense in Schoenborn and Tillett indicate that de-
spite general acceptance of the "reviewed and approved"
standard, the courts require more than simply a superfi-
cial review of contractor-prepared specifications. These
recent opinions demonstrate that the standard requires
some active involvement by government personnel.
The Shaw opinion, discussed previously, 23 3 purported
to narrow significantly the scope of the government estab-
lishment element of the defense. The Shaw court held
that a contractor may escape liability only if it affirmatively
proves "that it did not participate, or participated only
minimally, in the design of those products or parts of
products shown to be defective. 2 34 The court explained
this standard as follows:
Here, we do not ask the contractor to prove that the Gov-
emnment prepared the specs and find that the contractor's
participation in their development through "continuous
back and forth" will not defeat the defense, Koutsoubos, 755
F.2d at 355. Rather, we require the contractor to show
that it did not prepare the specs, and hold that the Gov-
ernment's participation, if sufficiently great, may prove the
defense. 3 5
A more reasoned approach to restricting the scope of
the "reviewed and approved" standard appears in the
opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas in Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp. 3 6 In
Trevino the court suggested that the government's review
of contractor specifications should involve a substantial
engineering evaluation of those specifications. 7 Refer-
ring to the Navy's review of General Dynamics' specifica-
tions, the court stated,
232 Id.
233 See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
2-14 778 F.2d at 746.
23 Id.
2M 626 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
2.7 See id. at 1337.
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If approval of the design of military hardware by examin-
ing [and] agreeing to a detailed description of the working
drawings of the system is sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of the government contractor's defense, then there
was no such "approval" under the facts of the case.
Although the government's review did involve some sub-
jective evaluation of the contents of the plans, the level of
examination did not equate to the amount of engineering
expertise required by General Dynamics to prepare the
plans. Therefore, this Court concludes that "true govern-
ment participation in the design" necessary to constitute
approval was lacking. Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 122.238
The Trevino court did not state clearly the degree of gov-
ernment participation required to satisfy the government
establishment element of the defense. The overall tenor
of the decision, however, suggests that the military must
retain final control over the acceptance or rejection of de-
tailed specifications and in fact must review the specifica-
tions closely enough to make an informed decision
concerning the adequacy of the specifications.239
The Fourth Circuit opinion in Tozer contains the most
recent judicial pronouncements on the "establishment of
specifications" issue.240 The Tozer court adopted a more
liberal interpretation of the term "establishment." Exhib-
iting strong concern about the effects that waiver of the
defense would have on the entire procurement process of
the United States military, the court held that "the con-
tractor's participation in design - or even its origination
of specifications - does not constitute a waiver of the
government contract defense.' '241 Holding that contractor
participation alone does not waive the defense, the court
stated,
If the defense were to be waived by such participation, the
contractor would be trapped between its fear of liability
and its desire to provide needed ideas and information.
2.18 Id.
239 See id.
24,, See 792 F.2d at 407-09; see also infra notes 241-243.
24, Tozer, 792 F.2d at 407.
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The "incentives for suppliers of military equipment to
work closely with and to consult the military authorities in
the development and testing of equipment" would be
lost. 2 4 2
The Fourth Circuit held that the defense should be avail-
able so long as there is "genuine government participa-
tion in the design. 243
C. The Product Meets the Government's Specifications in All
Material Respects
The second element of the government contractor de-
fense as formulated in Agent Orange is that the defendant's
product must meet the government's specifications "in all
material respects. ' 244 This relatively straightforward ele-
ment of the defense has not been a major issue in any of
the products liability cases decided after Agent Orange.
This stems in part from the Agent Orange declaration that
the "failure of a defendant to conform to the specifica-
tions would defeat the defense only if the discrepancy be-
tween specifications and product was a material one
.... 245 "Material" specifications relate to those aspects
of a product's design alleged to be defective. 46 Thus, the
defendant has only the burden of showing conformance
in the area of design alleged by plaintiff to be defective.2 47
In Koutsoubos the court found that the defendant estab-
lished the second element by submitting an affidavit and
supporting exhibits demonstrating that the Navy tested
the helicopter and found it acceptable:
[T]he Affidavit declares that the Navy established safety
242 Id. (quoting McKay, 704 F.2d at 450). The Tozer opinion is among the first of
the recent cases discussing the government contractor defense to recognize the
reality that the military equipment procurement process depends upon a "contin-
uous back and forth" of design revisions by contractors and the government. Id. at
407 (quoting Koulsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355).
243 Id. at 407-08.
244 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
2 - Id. at 1057.
2 Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 343.
2,4 See id.
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features, testing requirements, emergency exit marking
requirements, and interior lighting requirements. In
short, "[e]very feature of the CH-46A, including its water
landing and flotation capability and emergency egress and
lighting, was tested and inspected to Navy requirements."
Affidavit 11. Finally, "[o]n March 3, 1966, after satisfying
itself that Boeing had furnished an aircraft which met all
requirements of the Contract, the Navy accepted Helicop-
ter 152510. ' 24s
Similarly, the court in Hubbs noted that
if it is established at trial that the Navy tested and in-
spected the flight control system and determined it to
meet its own material design specifications, then defend-
ants will have met their burden with respect to the second
element of the government contract defense as it relates
to the design specification deviations alleged by
plaintiffs. .49
In sum, a defendant satisfies the second element by show-
ing that the government tested and inspected the portion
of the product alleged to be defective and found that it
met the government's specifications.
D. The Government Knew as Much or More Than
the Defendant About the Hazards Associated
With the Product
Setting out the final element of the government con-
tractor defense, the court in Agent Orange stated that it is
"only if defendants concealed or failed to disclose to the
government information about hazards of which the gov-
ernment was ignorant that defendants fail to gain the pro-
tection of the government contract defense."5'
Furthermore, the court held that a contractor will be insu-
lated from liability by the government contractor defense
if it can "show that it was not aware of hazard-causing de-
ficiencies in the specifications as to the design or method
248 Id. at 340.
241, 574 F. Supp. at 100.
2- 534 F. Supp. at 1057.
1986] GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
of manufacture, deficiencies which, if known to the govern-
ment, might have altered the government's decisions as to
whether and how to use the [product]." 25'
The Agent Orange passage cited above has been ex-
pressly adopted as the standard of proof for the warning
element of the defense in several of the military design
defects cases which have followed Agent Orange.252 Few of
these cases, however, provide much insight into how the
standard should be met. In Hubbs, for example, the court
found that the defendants had not met the burden of
proving that the government established the design of the
product.253  Thus, the Hubbs court never reached the
warning element. The court in Koutsoubos found that the
defendants in that case met the burden of proving that the
government established specifications for the product and
that the product conformed to those specifications. 54
The defendants in Koutsoubos failed to meet their burden
of proof with respect to the warning element of the de-
fense, however, and the district court denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment. 25 The court unfortu-
nately provided little instruction on how the defendants
should establish the warning element at trial. The only
guidance provided by the opinion on this question ap-
pears in the following passage:
Under this element of the defense it is appropriate to ad-
dress plaintiff's argument that the government contract
defense does not apply in a situation where the govern-
ment consulted with the contractor in establishing the
specifications for the product. As Judge Pratt noted in
Agent Orange, however, evidence of defendant participation
in preparation of the specifications could not defeat the
government contract defense, although such evidence
might be "relevant in establishing the relative degrees of
knowledge as between the government and the
251 Id. (emphasis added).
252 See, e.g., Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 100; Koutsoubos, 553 F. Supp. at 344.
253 574 F. Supp. at 99.
2- 553 F. Supp. at 344.
255 Id.
437
438 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
defendants."256
Only the Trevino opinion contains further substantive
discussion of the warning element of the defense. 7 In
Trevino the court found that the Navy hired General Dy-
namics specifically because the company possessed spe-
cialized knowledge of the submarine design and,
therefore, General Dynamics "assumed the responsibility
of advising and warning the Navy on the safety aspects of
the systems that General Dynamics was designing. 2 5 8
The court noted that both the Navy and General Dynam-
ics knew or should have known about the dangers associ-
ated with the system's potential to creat- a partial vacuum
absent basic safety features.2 5 9 However, the court found
that in light of the specialized knowledge for which Gen-
eral Dynamics was hired, the Navy's failure to perform
sufficient operational testing or to conduct a formal de-
sign review before putting the system into operation did
not relieve General Dynamics of liability. 26 0 The court
stated,
If either General Dynamics or the Navy had paid sufficient
attention to the COR or the working drawings or had en-
gaged in any quality assurance or operational testing pro-
cedures, the problem of a partial vacuum would have been
obvious. General Dynamics, however, failed to warn the
Navy about patent errors in the government's general re-
quirements or their own working drawing.26'
The Trevino court reasoning significantly increases the
burden of proof on the warning element of the govern-
ment contractor defense by requiring a contractor to warn
the government of patent errors in government specifica-
tions if the government hired the contractor for its spe-
cialized knowledge.
256 Id. (quoting Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1056).
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IV. JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE RATIONALES OFFERED IN
JUSTIFICATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
Although phrased different ways in different cases,
three basic rationales have been offered to justify applica-
tion of the government contractor defense in cases involv-
ing products built for the armed forces of the United
States.262 First, holding military suppliers liable without
regard to the extent of government involvement in the
design of products undermines the government's immu-
nity under the Feres-Stencel doctrine because military sup-
pliers pass on their accident costs to the United States
through contractual mechanisms. 263  Second, holding
contractors liable for design defects created or approved
by the government thrusts the judiciary into the military
decision-making process, raising concerns about separa-
tion of powers. 264 Third, extending the government's im-
munity to contractors provides an incentive for suppliers
of military equipment to consult and cooperate with the
government in the development and testing of military
equipment.265 Judicial reaction to these rationales has
been mixed. This section reviews the rationales and ex-
amines the reactions of the federal courts to each of the
rationales.
A. Abolishing the Government Contractor Defense Would
Increase the Cost of Military Products
In a products liability case involving a product not man-
ufactured for the military, a defendant technically liable
for a product defect can shift the liability burden to the
party actually responsible for the defect through a third-
party claim for contribution or indemnity.266 This princi-
262 See infra notes 263-265 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
264 See, e.g., Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp. at 1054-55.
265 See, e.g., McKay, 704 F.2d at 450.
26 See generally Greenstone, Spreading the Loss - Indemnity, Contribution, Compara-
tive Negligence and Subrogation, 13 FORUM 266 (1977); Jensvold, Modern Approach to
439
440 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [52
ple does not apply when the product was manufactured
for the Armed Forces of the United States. The United
States Supreme Court held in United States v. Yellow Cab
Co. 267 that the United States can be impleaded on a theory
of indemnity or contribution if the government shares at
least partial responsibility for an injury.268 However, the
Court qualified the Yellow Cab doctrine in Stencel Aero Engi-
neering Corp. v. United States269 by holding that a contractor
may implead the government only when the original
plaintiff could have sued the government directly.2 70 In
Stencel the Court rejected the contractor's indemnity claim
because the serviceman injured could not assert a claim
against the government directly under the Feres doc-
trine. 27' As a result of Stencel, a contractor who supplies
products to the military generally cannot assert a claim for
contribution or indemnity against the United States gov-
ernment for damages paid to injured military personnel in
a products liability suit.272
After Stencel it becomes obvious that disallowing the
government contractor defense might prompt military
contractors simply to pass the costs of product liability
judgments to the government in the form of increased
contract costs. 273 The McKay court recognized this, not-
ing that
holding the supplier liable in government contractor cases
without regard to the extent of government involvement
in fixing the product's design and specifications would
subvert the Feres-Stencel rule since military suppliers, de-
Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 1974 Ins. L.J. 591;
O'Donnell, Implied Indemnity in Modern Tort Litigation: The Case for a Public Policy
Analysis, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 268 (1975); Phillips, Contribution and Indemnity in
Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1974); Comment, Comparative Causation, In-
demnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 10
ST. MARY'S L.J. 587 (1979).
267 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
2- Id. at 546.
269 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
270 Id. at 673-74.
271 Id.
272 See id.
27- See McKay, 704 F.2d at 449.
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spite the government's immunity, would pass the cost of
accidents off to the United States through cost overrun
provisions in equipment contracts, through reflecting the
price of liability insurance in the contracts, or through
higher prices in later equipment sales.274
According to the McKay court, this interpretation is con-
sistent with the policy expressed in Stencel that plaintiffs
injured incident to military service should not be permit-
ted to "judicially admit at the back door that which has
been legislatively turned away at the front door. "275
B. The Defense Provides an Incentive for Contractors to
Consult and Cooperate with the Military
Another argument asserted in support of the govern-
ment contractor defense suggests that without the de-
fense, manufacturers who supply products to the military
have little incentive to inform the government of potential
defects in those products.2 76 Although this argument has
not been addressed at length by the courts, abolishing the
government contractor defense encourages contractors
not to report potential defects discovered after delivery of
the product. One easily can imagine how, without the
government contractor defense, a contractor's warning to
the military might be construed as an admission of liabil-
ity. Consider the following hypothetical example. As-
sume that a serviceman suffers permanent injury when the
ejection system of his fighter aircraft malfunctions during
a mid-air emergency. Assume further that a contractor
supplied the ejection system pursuant to government con-
tract. During testing of the product, the manufacturer un-
covers failures indicating a faulty parachute pack design.
The manufacturer urges the Air Force to change the de-
sign of the system, recommending certain changes to
solve the faulty design problems. The Air Force refuses
to allow the manufacturer to implement these changes
274 Id.
275 Id. (quoting Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673).
276 See McKay, 704 F.2d at 450.
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and instead insists on the implementation of its own de-
sign change or requires that the packs be built as origi-
nally designed. Under this compulsion the manufacturer
goes forward with pack production for the Air Force. The
manufacturer's warnings to the military concerning
problems with the parachute packs might be viewed in a
lawsuit as an admission that the packs were defective.
If the government contractor defense is not allowed in
cases like the hypothetical case above, manufacturers who
have doubts about whether or not a warning would be
heeded by the military logically would choose not to warn
the government of possible design defects. A warning
would result in certain liability should the manufacturer
subsequently be faced with a products liability suit. More-
over, if a contractor intentionally manufactures an unrea-
sonably dangerous product, it exposes itself to liability for
punitive damages.277 Together, these facts provide a
strong disincentive for a manufacturer to warn the mili-
tary of any potential design defects that the manufacturer
discovers. In contrast, by immunizing a contractor from
liability for design defects about which the contractor
warns the government, the government contractor de-
fense gives contractors a strong motivation to warn the
government of dangers inherent to the products they
manufacture.
In McKay the Ninth Circuit required only that contrac-
tors warn the military of risks known to the manufac-
turer.278 However, as one commentator counseled
government contractors after the McKay decision:
While the Rockwell court only required that the errors be
"patent," a prudent contractor will report errors that may
not be obvious. In that vien, contractors should report to
the Government all dangers, including those that seem re-
mote and unlikely. Since warning the Government is a re-
quirement for the defense to be effective, contractors
277 See Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1043 (5th Cir.
1984).
278 McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
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should err on the side of overwarning.2 79
While many courts have found the McKay rationale
valid, 8 0 the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the idea
that the government contractor defense encourages coop-
eration between the contractor and the military.28 ' In
Shaw the Eleventh Circuit stated,
We find the last McKay rationale - the notion that the
military contractor defense encourages the military and its
suppliers to work closely together, thereby making it eas-
ier to discover who is responsible for product design -
somewhat inscrutable. Indeed, on the contrary, our expe-
rience is that the more closely the contractor and the mili-
tary work together, the more difficult it is to determine
exactly who made design decisions.28 2
The Eleventh Circuit, however, misunderstands the ra-
tionale set forth in McKay. McKay does not view the de-
fense as merely a mechanism for more easily determining
who is responsible for design decisions. The nature of
government military contracting requires the military to
assume responsibility for making the final determination
on any given design element. The rationale expressed in
McKay simply supposes that the defense provides incen-
tive for the contractor to relay all information in its pos-
session to the military so that the decision made by the
military will be an informed decision.28 3
C. The Military Decision-Making Process Should Not Be
Subject to Judicial Review
Perhaps the most persuasive justification offered for the
government contractor defense rests with the argument
that holding military suppliers liable for defective designs
after the United States establishes or approves those de-
279 Polinsky, Product Liability and the United States Government Contractor, 14 PuB.
CoNT. L.J. 313, 330 (1984).
280 See, e.g., Tillett, 756 F.2d at 597; Koustoubos, 755 F.2d at 355.
281 Shaw, 778 F.2d at 743.
282 Id.
283 See McKay, 704 F.2d at 450.
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signs thrusts the judiciary into the military decision-mak-
284ing process. This rationale has been raised in many
government contractor defense cases involving military
products2 8 5 and has been considered generally persuasive
by most federal courts who have considered the issue. 2 6
Most of these courts note that second-guessing military
decisions on product designs in the courtroom often re-
quires members of the Armed Services to testify as to
each other's decisions and actions.2 8 ' Such trials raise
concerns about adverse effects on both military discipline
and national security. 28 8
In Agent Orange the court expressly recognized the sepa-
ration of powers problem that would result if the govern-
ment contractor defense did not exist to bar judicial
intervention when appropriate. 2 9 The court stated,
The purpose of a government contractor defense in the
context of [military products liability cases]" is to permit
the government to wage war in whatever manner the gov-
ernment deems advisable, and to do so with the support of
suppliers of military weapons. Considerations of cost, time
of production, risks to participants, risks to third parties,
and any other factors that might weigh on the decisions of
whether, when, and how to use a particular weapon, are
uniquely questions for the military and should be exempt
from review by civilian courts.29 0
This language from Agent Orange reiterates a point of na-
tional public policy recognized by numerous other
courts. 9' In Sanner, for example, the plaintiff alleged a
design defect in an Army jeep manufactured by Ford Mo-
284 See id. at 449.
285 See Tillet, 756 F.2d at 597; McKay, 704 F.2d at 449; Agent Orange, 534 F. Supp.
at 1054; see also Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d 250, 253 (9th Cir. 1971); Aero
Corp. v. Department of the Navy, 493 F. Supp. 558, 567 (D.D.C. 1981); Montgom-
ery, 231 F. Supp. at 450.
288 See cases cited supra note 77.
287 See Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
288 Asselta & Fitzpatrick, Government Contractor Defense, 1984 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 1,
21-22.
289 534 F. Supp. at 1054.
2 o Id. at 1054 n.1.
291 See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
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tor Company because the jeep lacked seat belts.292 The
Sanner court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford
under the government contractor defense, stating,
The procurement of military equipment by the Govern-
ment is made pursuant to its war powers and its inherent
right and obligation to maintain an adequate defense pos-
ture. In carrying out its responsibilities the Government
must be given wide latitude in its decision making
process....
To impose liability on a governmental contractor who
strictly complies with the plans and specifications provided
to it by the Army in a situation such as this would seriously
impair the governments [sic] ability to formulate policy
and make judgments pursuant to its war powers. The
Government is the agency charged with the responsibility
of deciding the nature and type of military equipment that
suits its needs, not a manufacturer such as Ford.293
Similarly, the court noted in Horn that "in judgments re-
quiring military expertise and involving military discre-
tion within unique professional fields . . . 'judges are not
given the task of running the Army.' "294 In Campbell v.
Beaughler295 the court observed that "the military has a
right to govern its affairs without untoward intervention
from the judiciary. 296
The Fourth Circuit discussed the separation of powers
rationale at some length in Tozer.2 97 The court noted that,
of the three branches of government, the judicial branch
is "by design" the least involved with military matters:
"The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional military judgments, sub-
ject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Execu-
292 Sanner, 364 A.2d at 43-44; see supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
293 364 A.2d at 47.
29 514 F.2d at 551 (quoting Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953)).
20., 519 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1975).
2- Id. at 1309.
-7 See infra notes 298-299 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of
the recent Tozer decision, see supra notes 138-146 and accompanying text.
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tive Branches." Gillian v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)
(emphasis in original). Judges possess no power "To de-
clare War ... To raise and support Armies ... To provide
and maintain a Navy." U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 11-13.
Nor have they been "given the task of running the Army."
Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953). In the face of a
"textually demonstrable" commitment of an issue to "a
coordinate political department," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962), judicial caution is advisable. Even apart
from matters of constitutional text, the reservation ofjudi-
cial judgment on strictly military matters is sound policy.
The judicial branch contains no Department of Defense or
Armed Services Committee or other ongoing fund of ex-
pertise on which its personnel may draw. Nor is it seemly
that a democracy's most serious decisions, those providing
for common survival and defense, be made by its least ac-
countable branch of government.298
In concluding that the separation of powers concerns
were overriding when compared with policy matters such
as promoting safety, the court noted that "[w]hile debate
over the safety and necessity of advanced weaponry is es-
sential, the First Amendment does not require that the fo-
rum be the courtroom or the vehicle be a lawsuit. 299
The separation of powers rationale for the government
contractor defense is compelling. Even the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, demonstrating an otherwise hostile attitude toward
the government contractor defense in Shaw, found that
"the constitutional separation of powers compels the judi-
ciary to defer to a military decision to use a weapon or
weapons system (or a part thereof) designed by an in-
dependent contractor, despite its risks to servicemen. 3 0 0
This judicial reluctance to second-guess military prod-
uct design decisions also comports with basic common
sense. The policy decisions made by the Armed Forces
during preparation of design specifications and drawings
usually are so complex and interwoven that no judicial
2!.. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 405.
29) Id.
--. 778 F.2d at 743.
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proceeding could or should attempt to adjudicate the pro-
priety of those decisions. Imagine the chaos that would
occur in the Armed Forces of the United States if the judi-
ciary could cause the recall or withdrawal of military
equipment and products.
V. CONCLUSION
As defense contractors have become increasingly reli-
ant upon the government contractor defense, both sup-
porters and critics of the defense have become more
vocal. Those in favor of the defense believe that it prop-
erly keeps the judicial branch from becoming involved in
military matters, reduces the cost of military products,
and provides incentive for manufacturers to cooperate
with the military to develop safer products. Those op-
posed to the defense maintain that it unfairly burdens
plaintiffs with the costs of injuries caused by defective mil-
itary products. Although federal court treatment of the
defense has been far from consistent over the years, the
elements of the defense and the standard of proof for
proving those elements have taken on clearer definition
since the 1980 Agent Orange decision.
The government contractor defense will not shield a
manufacturer from liability simply because the govern-
ment enjoys immunity under the Feres-Stencel doctrine. To
avail itself of the defense, a manufacturer must demon-
strate all three elements of the defense. First, it must
show that the government established the specifications
for the product. The term "established" has been con-
strued to mean that the government either provided com-
plete specifications or reviewed and approved
specifications from the manufacturer. 30 1 Next, the manu-
facturer must demonstrate that the product in question
met the government's specifications in all material re-
spects. °2 Finally, the manufacturer must prove that the
lot See supra notes 182-239 and accompanying text.
."1 See supra notes 244-249 and accompanying text.
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government possessed knowledge or was warned of any
hazards associated with the product. 3
While debate over the government contractor defense
undoubtedly will continue, the courts have firmly em-
braced the concept that manufacturers of military prod-
ucts should not be held responsible for design defects
when the military makes the ultimate design decisions.
Even the more recent opinions do not reflect complete
agreement concerning the precise theoretical rationale
for the defense. An examination of these recent opinions,
however, demonstrates that the courts generally are com-
mitted to making the government contractor defense a
permanent part of American jurisprudence.
.o. See supra notes 250-261 and accompanying text.
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